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1. Introduction
The literature on bank efficiency and productivity has expanded dramatically since the early
eighties, and continues to flourish today. The amount of research has already warranted two
surveys (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). Since the publication of
the latter, further empirical evidence has been made available, partly due to the substantial
restructuring of the banking industries in several Western economies since the onset of the
international financial crisis in 2007. Under these renewed circumstances, the question of how
banks’ efficiency is being affected naturally arises or, perhaps more interestingly, calls for an
analysis of the links between pre-crisis and crisis efficiency levels.
According to the survey by Berger and Humphrey (1997), most studies on the efficiency
of financial institutions confined their analyses to either (input) technical or cost efficiency—
or both. Out of the 130 studies surveyed, only nine focused on profit efficiency. However,
as Berger et al. (1993b) state, these efficiencies may be much more relevant than expected.
Indeed, except for the study by Miller and Noulas (1996), profit inefficiencies have generally
been found to be larger than those attributable to the failure to minimize costs. Much more
recent surveys such as Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) also corroborated this sort of unbalance in
the literature, since their study, which covered studies employing operational research and
artificial intelligence techniques to assess bank performance, corroborated the relative absence
of studies analyzing either profit or revenue efficiency in banking.
This type of inefficiency is important for several reasons. First, we recall that banks attempt
not only to offer products and services at the minimum cost—i.e., to be cost efficient—but also
to maximize the revenues they generate—i.e., to be revenue efficient. Together, both attempts
imply profit efficiency. By omitting the revenue side, we provide a partial, and probably
misleading, view of bank performance, although some relatively recent initiatives such as
Cuesta and Orea (2002), Rezitis (2008) and Feng and Serletis (2010) have attempted to fix this
gap in the literature, by considering output orientations. We will expand further on this below.
The scarce empirical evidence adds to the higher quantitative relevance of assessing profit
inefficiency relative to cost inefficiency, suggesting significant inefficiencies on the revenue side,
either due to a wrong output mix—given output prices—or the setting of an inadequate price
policy. Some studies that estimate both profit and cost inefficiency, such as Berger and Mester
(1997) concluded that the first type of inefficiency is always lower—see also Maudos and Pastor
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(2001), who focus on an international sample. In addition, as Berger and Mester (1997) suggest,
and contrary to what one might a priori expect, profit (and/or revenue) efficiency and cost
efficiency are not always positively correlated, and they could even be negatively correlated.
In such circumstances, the most cost inefficient banks could offset this apparent inefficiency
by adopting different paths such as raising higher revenues than their competitors through
their output mix, or exploiting stronger market power when setting prices. Berger and Mester
(1997) refer to the situation in which market power exists in fixing output prices as alternative
profit efficiency.1 In contrast, if output prices are given, they use the concept of standard profit
efficiency.
Therefore, cost inefficiency might also include some costs that should be attached to a
bank’s product mix. Accordingly, one should consider the possibility that some specializations
are more costly than others, which does not necessarily entail their being more inefficient. Es-
timating profit or revenue efficiency might capture this specialization effect. Higher revenues
could therefore offset the higher costs of firms that emphasize more expensive product lines.
This article attempts to measure both sides of inefficiency, i.e. cost and revenue, by applying
Free Disposal Hull (FDH) (Deprins et al., 1984; Diewert and Fox, 2014) the non-convex variant of
one of the most popular linear programming methods considered to measure bank efficiency,
namely, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978). Although some authors
such as Briec et al. (2004) have argued convincingly about the advantages of using non-convex
methodologies (such as FDH) as opposed to convex methods (such as DEA), in certain contexts
such as Spanish banking (on which we focus) the empirical evidence available so far has
completely disregarded non-convex technologies.
Relatively few studies such as those by Färe et al. (2004), Devaney and Weber (2002), and
Maudos and Pastor (2003) have used linear programming techniques (either DEA or FDH) to
measure profit efficiency. If the analysis is confined to revenue efficiency, the existing literature
on applications to the banking sector is rare, but existent (Cuesta and Orea, 2002; Rezitis, 2008;
Feng and Serletis, 2010). In contrast, the number of studies that have analyzed bank profit effi-
ciency using econometric techniques is remarkably higher. Among them, and apart of some of
1In a slightly previous application, Berger et al. (1996) had evaluated revenue economies of scope, considering
an alternative specification for the revenue function in which banks were known to have some control over the
level of output prices charged. This view was also adopted by Humphrey and Pulley (1997). However, later on
Khumbhakar (2006) and Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar (2013) proposed to estimate the so-called Composite
Non-Standard Profit Function (CNSPF), due to some advantages over non-standard profit efficiency approaches.
We thank an anonymous referee for this clarification.
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the contributions cited above, we should also include in this group the studies by Berger et al.
(1993a), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), Maudos et al. (2002), Isik and Hassan (2002), Vander Ven-
net (2002) and, more recently, Pasiouras et al. (2009), Srairi (2010), Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras
(2010) and Akhigbe and McNulty (2011), among others. However, some contributions have
still been added to the field of nonparametric profit efficiency measurement. In this (much
smaller) group, we find recent theoretical work from Fu et al. (2016) and Cherchye et al. (2016),
and, from a more applied perspective, Ray and Das (2008) and Ariff and Luc (2008).
Our analysis focuses on Spain, which has one of the largest banking systems in Europe. It
offers a scenario where profound changes have taken place such as interest rate deregulation,
partial or total removal of legal coefficients, legal homogenization of both commercial and
savings banks, free entry for European Union banks (as long as they comply with European
Union legislation), removal of the restrictions on the geographical expansion of savings banks,
implementation of new telecommunications technologies, etc. However, interest in analyzing
this banking system has grown mainly as a result of the current scenario of international
economic and financial crisis, which is having a severe effect on the Spanish economy and its
financial institutions in particular. Although several euro-area countries are now under strain,
the difficulties of the Spanish financial system are particularly worrying because of its size.
In this line, although international investors are increasingly concerned about the various
performance measures for Spanish banks, a rigorous performance analysis such as an accurate
measurement of efficiency using state-of-the-art methods may provide some valuable infor-
mation that goes beyond that of the rating agencies. More specifically, in this restructured
industry, in which financial institutions are adapting to the new macroeconomic and regula-
tory scenario, analyzing bank efficiency is gaining momentum, partly because of the alleged
inverse relationship between competition and inefficiency or, more precisely, X-inefficiency
(Leibenstein, 1966, 1978a,b).2 Most empirical analysis of the competitive viability of Span-
ish banking firms took place in the 1990s and early 2000s when deregulatory initiatives were
having their effects on banks. However, to a large extent these research studies focused over-
whelmingly on cost aspects, or even on a particular component of cost efficiency (technical
efficiency).
More specifically, some previous studies estimated the effects of the deregulation process
2However, Stennek (2000) casted some doubt on the validity of X-inefficiency as a survival condition in a
competitive environment.
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on the efficiency of Spanish savings banks, such as Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996), Lozano-
Vivas (1997), or Kumbhakar et al. (2001). However, others included both commercial and
savings banks in the analysis; see, for instance, Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1997), Tortosa-Ausina
(2002a,b,c, 2003) or Carbó Valverde et al. (2007), among others. By comparison, the number
of studies analyzing the the efficiency of Spanish credit unions is much lower, with very few
exceptions such as Marco Gual and Moya Clemente (1999) and, more recently, Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell (2004) and Grifell-Tatjé (2011), none of which focus explicitly on revenue efficiency.
This paper differs from the previous literature in that we perform an efficiency analysis
for Spanish banking covering a very recent period including both pre-crisis and crisis years
(important because of the major effect the crisis is having on the Spanish economy in general
and the Spanish financial system in particular); it includes commercial banks, savings banks
and credit unions (relevant because of the way the crisis has different effects on the different
organizational forms); it examines both cost and revenue efficiency; and it considers Free
Disposal Hull (FDH), the non-convex variant of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which, as
far as we know, has not been previously applied to the particular case of Spanish banking.
In this particular regard, the studies that have examined either profit or revenue in Spanish
banking are scant, boiling down to Lozano-Vivas (1997), Maudos and Pastor (2003) and, to a
lesser extent, Cuesta and Orea (2002).
The study proceeds as follows. The next section (section 2) presents the methodology used
to measure cost and revenue efficiency. Section 3 describes the data and the specification of
banking inputs and outputs. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 outlines some
concluding remarks.
2. Methodology
Most of the literature related to the measurement of economic efficiency has based its analysis
either on parametric or nonparametric frontier methods. As Murillo-Zamorano (2004) indi-
cates in his survey paper, the choice of estimation method has been an issue of debate, with
some researchers preferring the parametric, and others the nonparametric approach (Murillo-
Zamorano, 2004, p.33).
Efficiency measurement involves a comparison of actual with optimal performance located
on the relevant frontier but, since the true frontier is unknown, an empirical approximation
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is needed. This approximation is frequently dubbed a “best-practice” frontier (Fried et al.,
2008, p.32). However, as Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest when inquiring whether a
“best” frontier method exists, “the lack of agreement among researchers regarding a preferred
frontier model at present boils down to a difference of opinion regarding the lesser of evils”.
On the one hand, the parametric approaches fail when they impose a particular functional
form that presupposes the shape of the frontier—hence, if the functional form is misspecified,
measured efficiency may be mixed up with the specification errors. On the other hand, non-
parametric methods impose less structure on the frontier but fail because they de not allow
sufficiently for random error (due to either luck, measurement errors, etc).3
Some research studies have analyzed financial institutions’ efficiency using both paramet-
ric and nonparametric methods. In some, correlations between the two approaches are ex-
tremely low, and negative. In others, the opposite result is achieved. Chronologically, Ferrier
and Lovell (1990) compared efficiency scores yielded by econometric and linear programming
techniques, and found statistically insignificant Spearman correlation coefficients of 0.0138.
Similarly, Bauer et al. (1998) found that the nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
technique and the parametric techniques give only very weakly consistent rankings when com-
pared with each other, and that the average rank-order correlation between the parametric and
nonparametric methods was only 0.098.
In some studies, such as that by Weill (2001), based on European samples, no positive
relation between any parametric approach and DEA is found. In a study based on UK building
societies (Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1996), the Spearman rank correlation was even negative.
In contrast, high and positive correlations were found by Resti (1997), based on a sample of
Italian banks, Eisenbeis et al. (1999), based on bank holding company data, and Cummins and
Zi (1998), based on US life insurance firm data. If we extend the scope of the analysis to include
studies outside the field of financial institutions, we find more empirical evidence comparing
the two types of techniques such as studies by Banker et al. (1986), De Borger and Kerstens
(1996), Hjalmarsson et al. (1996), or Resti (2000). An excellent and updated comparison of
techniques is provided by Badunenko et al. (2012).
3Apart from the surveys on financial institutions’ efficiency referred to in the introduction, there are also mono-
graphs that provide careful descriptions of the available methods to measure efficiency in general. Some of them
focus both on parametric and nonparametric techniques (Coelli et al., 1998; Fried et al., 2008; Bogetoft and Otto,
2011), whereas others confine the analysis either to the parametric (Lovell and Kumbhakar, 2000) or nonparametric
(Färe and Grosskopf, 2004; Daraio and Simar, 2007) fields.
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In the last few years, from a theoretical point of view parametric and nonparametric ap-
proaches have evolved at different paces. Up to the mid-nineties, when most of the studies
cited in the preceding paragraph were published, the contributions in both fields were simi-
lar. However, in the last ten years the proposals in the nonparametric field have outnumbered
those in parametric field. These proposals include the order-m (Cazals et al., 2002) and order-α
(Aragon et al., 2005; Daouia and Simar, 2007) estimators, which are more robust to extreme
values than either DEA or FDH (Free Disposable Hull). Although these methods are gaining
wider acceptance, some critiques have also been put forward (Krüger, 2012). Some initiatives
have been also developed in the parametric field such as those based on Bayesian statistics
(Van den Broeck et al., 1994), but the number of proposals is been much lower—not only from
a theoretical point of view but also in terms of applications.
Most of the nonparametric estimators cited in the previous paragraph are based on DEA
and FDH. However, none of them have explicitly modeled how prices enter the analysis. Some
of them also have problems in handling multiple outputs and multiple inputs, which also af-
fects several of the Bayesian proposals. But in some contexts such as banking, the availability of
prices, and the multiple-input/multiple-output nature of banking firms may suggest that pre-
vious nonparametric methods—such as DEA and FDH—could be more appropriate, at least
until further progress is made in the aforementioned new fields of research. This constitutes
promising field of theoretical research.
We therefore take the set of activity analysis techniques presented and revised in Färe and
Grosskopf (2004) as our reference for measuring efficiency. Let x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ R
N
+ be the
input quantities, with associated input prices ω = (ω1, . . . ,ωN) ∈ R
N
+ , and y = (y1, . . . , yM) ∈
R
M
+ be the output quantities, with associated output prices p = (p1, . . . , pM) ∈ R
M
+ . Accord-
ingly, total costs and total revenues will be defined as ω′x = ∑Nn=1 ωnxn and p
′y = ∑Mm=1 pmym,
respectively. It is important to note that we are assuming that both input and output quantities
are divisible and, more importantly, the costs and revenues they generate, respectively, are also
divisible. This is a critical issue in banking, since sufficiently disaggregated information is not
always available.
Technology is defined as
T = {(x, y) : x can produce y}, (1)
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and input requirement and output sets are defined as
L(y) = {x : (x, y) ∈ T }, y ∈ RM+ , (2)
and
P(x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ T }, x ∈ RN+, (3)
respectively.
If x∗s and y
∗
s are the optimal input and output vectors for firm s, s = 1, . . . , S, respec-
tively, cost and revenue efficiency coefficients will be defined as CEs = ω′sx
∗
s/ω
′
sxs and REs =
p′sy
∗
s/p
′
sys. The coefficients will be bounded by unity from above and below for cost efficiency
and revenue efficiency, respectively; in other words, in either case efficient firms will be those
with efficiency scores equal to one—or 100, if results are expressed as percentages.
In the short run framework, these coefficients have to be adapted to consider the existence
of fixed (xs, f ) and variable (xs,v) inputs. As fixed inputs can not adjust, the short run cost
efficiency coefficient becomes
CEs =
ω′s,vx
∗
s,v + ω
′
s, f xs, f
ω′s,vxs,v + ω
′
s, f xs, f
(4)
whereas, on the revenues’ side, the corresponding efficiency coefficient would become:
REs =
p′sy
∗
s
p′sys
(5)
Optimal values are found by solving linear programming problems. For short run cost
efficiency, considering variable cost minimization in which the input quantities are modified
to reduce the variable costs (where Xv, X f and Y are observed data) for each s firm is as
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follows:
minλ,y∗ w
′
sx
∗
v
s.t. −ys + Yλ ≥ 0,
x∗v − Xvλ ≥ 0,
xs, f − Xfλ ≥ 0,
1′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0,
λ ∈ [0, 1].
(6)
For the revenue efficiency coefficient, the program attempts to modify the output quantities
in order to maximize the revenues (taking the output prices as given). On the inputs side, the
restrictions are the same for both the fixed and the variable inputs:
maxλ,y∗ p
′
sy
∗
s.t. −y∗ + Yλ ≥ 0,
xs,v − Xvλ ≥ 0,
xs, f − Xfλ ≥ 0,
1′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0,
λ ∈ [0, 1].
(7)
DEA has been used much more frequently than FDH. However, the technology defined
by FDH is nonconvex, which implies that an assumption is being dropped (convexity), and it
therefore has the advantage of being a priori more flexible (see Deprins et al., 1984). Further-
more, as indicated by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), FDH has several attractive statistical prop-
erties; for instance it is a consistent estimator for any monotone boundary, by imposing only
strong disposability. Actually, the only assumption required for the validity of the FDH is the
monotonicity of the technology. Moreover, some authors such as Park et al. (2000) have shown
that imposing convexity might be problematic, since a convex model causes specification error
when the true technology is nonconvex. In contrast, when the true technology is convex, the
FDH estimator converges to the true estimator (see also Simar and Wilson, 2000; Briec et al.,
2004). Finally, having into account that in our data set different banking organizations are
included (commercial banks and savings banks) convexity could imply that strange convex
9
combinations of these two organizations could have a significant impact on the reference fron-
tier; one way to avoid this potential problem is to define a non-convex technology.Given these
advantages, for solving the programming problems defined above we considered FDH, which
is specified by setting the constraint λ ∈ [0, 1].
3. Data and variables
Data were provided by Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database. Our sample is made up of Spanish
banking firms for the 2005–2009 period. It includes commercial banks, savings banks, and
credit unions. Most studies (see, for instance Bernad et al., 2008) usually exclude credit unions,
arguing that they do not really compete with the other two groups of banks, and that their
share of total assets is less than 10%. Although some others such as Carbó Valverde et al.
(2007) do not include them because of the lack of information, in general the exclusion of these
financial institutions is based on the grounds of size (they account for less thant 10% of total
banking assets) and objectives (their main goal is usually to provide financial services to their
members). However, given the importance of this type of institutions in some particular fields
such as financial exclusion (Carbó et al., 2007), and the diminishing role of savings banks in this
field (Alamá and Tortosa-Ausina, 2012), we included them in our sample. For a comprehensive
description of the differences between the three types of banks see, for instance, Crespí et al.
(2004).
In addition, we also consider that the period analyzed is relevant because it includes the
years in which the financial and economic crises started to take effect in several countries and,
therefore, since our sample considers the three types of banks, we can analyze how commercial
banks, savings banks and credit unions have performed differently in these turbulent times.
Data come from each banking firms’ balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, and
they are expressed in thousands of US dollars and are inflation adjusted. After removing
some unreliable data, excluding all non-consistent values (such as zero total assets or zero
employees) we have a total of 763 observations for all sample years. Since the Bankscope
database does not provide data on the number of employees, we completed this information
from three additional sources: AEB (“Asociación Española de Banca”) for commercial banks,
CECA (“Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro”) for savings banks and UNACC (“Unión
Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito”), for credit unions. Although many previous studies
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that also use Bankscope data such as, for instance, Altunbas¸ et al. (2001), do not consider the
number of employees either, they encountered greater difficulties in considering alternative
databases because they focused on banks from different countries.
Specifying inputs and, especially, outputs, is often a controversial issue in banking. On the
input side, our choice is in line with most previous literature. We consider three inputs, namely,
loanable funds, or financial capital (referred to here as vx1, since it is a variable input), number
of employees (variable input vx2), and physical capital (which is the fixed input f x1). See Table
1 for specific definitions and summary statistics. Each of these input categories generates
costs, referred to as VC1 (total interest expenses), VC2 (personnel expenses) and FC1 (other
operating expenses). We can easily calculate prices for each input category (vw1 = VC1/vx1,
vw2 = VC2/vx2 and f w1 = FC1/ f x1 for inputs loanable funds, labor and physical capital,
respectively).
Modeling the output side entails some added difficulties. There are three basic approaches
to define bank output, namely, the productions approach, the transactions approach and the
intermediation approach Sturm and Williams (2008). These different approaches are one of
the reasons why non-homogeneous efficiency scores might be obtained even if similar data
are used (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). In this study we use the intermediation approach
and, within this, the asset approach to define bank output where total loans and securities are
outputs.4 Total earning assets can be decomposed into loans (y1, see Table 1), which represent
traditional lending activity, and other earning assets (y2), which refer to non-lending activities.
Some recent contributions such as Casu and Girardone (2010), or Chortareas et al. (2011) have
also considered these two outputs.
Our first output “loans” (y1), reflects the traditional lending activities of the banking sector.
This output includes all types of loans to customers (residential mortgage loans, other mort-
gage loans, other customer/retail loans, corporate and commercial loans and other loans), as
well as loans and advances to banks. As loans to customers we consider “net loans”. The
4The other two approaches to define bank output within the intermediation approach are the value added and
the user cost approaches. Due to unavailability of data, most research studies have chosen either the value added
or the asset approach. Yet as Colangelo and Inklaar (2012) indicate, statistical agencies more frequently consider
the user cost approach. According to this approach, banks do not charge explicit fees for many of their services
but rather bundle the payment for services with the interest rates charged on loans and paid for deposits. Some
recent papers have considered this approach, including (apart from Colangelo and Inklaar, 2012), Basu et al. (2011)
and Diewert et al. (2012). Despite their advantages, most of these proposals are based on information that is only
available at the country level. Consequently, extending the definition these studies use to bank level data is difficult
because the necessary information is not available at the firm level.
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income generated by this first output is “interest income”, which includes “interest income on
loans” plus “other interest income”. The output price, r1, is the ratio of interest income (R1)
to the value of loans (y1; see Table 1). Actually, having to construct output prices from out-
put quantities and their associated revenues might be problematic. In our particular case, in
order to deal with this problem we dropped those observations corresponding to “unreason-
able” prices. Although this concept might be arbitrary, we decided to drop those observations
whose prices could be regarded as outliers, considering as such the ones that can be found
when plotting a box plot—i.e., values greater than 1.5× IQR or lower than −1.5× IQR..
In the second output “other operating income” (y2) we include other non-interest operating
income plus dividend income. Within total non-interest operating income we include net gains
(losses) on trading and derivatives, net gains (losses) on other securities, net gains (losses) on
assets at face value (FV), net insurance income, net fees and commissions, and other operating
income (the sum of these six variables represents total non-interest operating income). The
second output cannot be decomposed in terms of quantity and the price component because
it is an income (revenue) itself; we therefore consider price for output 2 (r2) the unity and,
consequently, the revenues this output generates (R2) to be the same as the value of the output
(R2 = y2).
4. Results
4.1. Cost and revenue efficiencies: some trends
We report summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for both cost and revenue ef-
ficiencies in Table 2. Results are reported for all three types of banking firms (commercial
banks, savings banks and credit unions), as well as for both sub-periods considered (pre-crisis,
2005–2007, and crisis, 2008–2009).
Results show that, on average, commercial banks are the most efficient institutions. This
result is robust both across type of efficiency measured (cost and revenue) as well as sub-
period (pre-crisis and crisis years). In the case of cost efficiency commercial banks’ efficiency
averages to 98.44% during the pre-crisis years, implying that these firms’ inefficiencies are
quite low—recall that efficient banks are those whose efficiency is 100%. In contrast, during
the same sub-period savings banks were the most inefficient firms, with average efficiencies of
92.84% (on average, these banks could have saved 7.16% of their costs). Credit unions lie in
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the middle, slightly closer to savings banks (their cost efficiency is, on average, 95.05%).
During the pre-crisis years commercial banks also show the best relative performance
(101.34%). Recall that for this type of efficiency, values closer to 100% also indicate higher
efficiency, although the scale is inverse (the most inefficient decision making units have effi-
ciency scores much higher than one, and values close to 100% indicate lower inefficiency). In
this case credit unions perform worse, on average, than savings banks (111.18% vs. 108.34%),
which could be due to the fact that this type of bank has different objectives.
Underlying these average values we find remarkably differing dispersion indicators. Com-
mercial banks are relatively homogeneous for both types of efficiency (their values are 5.66
and 5.78 for cost and revenue efficiency, respectively). In contrast, both savings banks and
credit unions show notable disparities. In the case of savings banks, the standard deviation
values are relatively similar for both types of efficiencies, whereas in the case of credit unions
the dispersion for revenue efficiency is almost three times the value found for cost efficiency.
However, during the crisis years of our sample (2008 and 2009) most of the discrepancies
disappeared and, on average, cost efficiencies are very similar for the three bank types. Some
differences still persist in the case of revenue efficiency for credit unions (104.22%), which also
show large discrepancies as measured by a high value for the standard deviation (12.11).
Although the information reported in Table 2 is meaningful, it is entirely confined to two
summary statistics—mean and standard deviation. Figures 1 and 2 display box plots on cost
and revenue efficiencies, respectively, for all types of firms and both sub-periods. Specifically,
in the upper panel of Figure 1 we provide box plots for the cost efficiency of the three types of
banks during the pre-crisis period, and the lower panel reports analogous information for the
crisis period. Figure 2 is the revenue efficiency counterpart to Figure 1.
The inspection of the box plots reveals several patterns, two of which prevail. First, com-
mercial banks are apparently much more efficient than both savings banks and credit unions,
regardless of the type of efficiency (cost, revenue) or period considered (pre-crisis, crisis). Sec-
ond, inefficient behavior decreased substantially during the crisis period, especially for savings
banks and credit unions, regardless of the type of efficiency.
Therefore, although before the start of the crisis the magnitude of the inefficiencies was
substantial, especially for savings banks and credit unions, inefficient banks made remarkable
efforts to catch up with the benchmarks. This relative inefficiency of savings banks had already
been found in previous contributions such as, for instance, Tortosa-Ausina (2002c)—although
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most previous studies did not focus on revenue efficiency, nor consider nonconvex approaches
such as FDH. However, the initiatives to properly test for the significance of the differences
between different types of banks were relatively scant. Comparisons extending the analysis to
the case of credit unions are also very scarce.
4.2. Testing for the differences: models, contexts and types of banks
The results reported above are informative. However, although the analysis of the entire dis-
tributions provided by box plots (Figures 1 and 2) adds complexity to the analysis of means
and standard deviations (Table 2), they are essentially descriptive.
In this section we go a step farther by examining whether the efficiency differences found
are significant or not. Specifically, we focus on three sources of heterogeneity, namely, the type
of efficiency considered (cost vs. revenue efficiency), the type of bank (commercial banks vs.
savings banks vs. credit unions), or the temporal context (either pre-crisis or crisis years).
To do this we can consider a variety of instruments. Given the nonparametric nature of
the techniques used to measure efficiency, which are possibly the “most” nonparametric of the
nonparametric techniques (due to the relaxation of the convexity assumption), we deem it also
appropriate to consider nonparametric techniques in this second part of the analysis.
Specifically, the Li (1996) test allows us to test whether two given distributions, say f (·)
and g()˙, estimated nonparametrically via kernel smoothing, differ statistically. Therefore, we
can actually ascertain whether the differences observed for the box plots in Figures 1 and 2 are
statistically significant or not—i.e. we would not test whether some summary statistics (mean,
standard deviation) differ but whether the entire distributions of efficiencies differ.
Results are provided in Tables 3, 4 and 5. In each of these tables we consider a different
type of variation. Specifically, in Table 3 we focus on the difference between the two models or
type of efficiency considered—cost or revenue efficiency. In Table 4 we explicitly test whether
the differences for the three types of banks are relevant, and in Table 5 we focus on the two
relevant periods (pre-crisis and crisis).
Results in Table 3, accounting for the differences for the two types of efficiencies (cost
and revenue efficiency) are not significant when considering the entire period of analysis,
regardless of the type of firm. We only find significant differences at the 1% level for the
pre-crisis period for both savings banks and credit unions—basically because during the crisis
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years most of these banks became efficient and, therefore, discrepancies can no longer be
significant.
In contrast, the comparative analysis for the different bank types performed in Table 4
reveals that the significant differences across types of banks hold regardless of the type of
efficiency or period. These differences, however, do not exist when comparing savings banks
and credit unions—in this particular case the discrepancies are never significant. In contrast,
commercial banks are more efficient than the other two bank types except for the crisis period,
when differences completely disappear.
We also explicitly test for temporal differences, and the results are reported in Table 5. In
this case, although a proper dynamic analysis such as that provided by the Malquist index is
not performed, results indicate that the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level
for both savings banks and credit unions. However, this result is not mirrored for commercial
banks, which were already quite efficient before the crisis started.
5. Conclusions
Over the last thirty years the Spanish banking system has undergone remarkable changes,
mostly brought about by deregulatory initiatives. Some of these began as far back as the early
seventies, but deregulation intensified in the eighties, just before Spain joined the former Eu-
ropean Economic Community and when the Single European Market was established. Most of
these deregulatory initiatives ultimately aimed to allow Spanish banking institutions (namely,
commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions) to cope with the threat of potential entry
from their European peers.
In that scenario, a relatively high number of research studies analyzed aspects related to
the efficiency and productivity of Spanish banking firms. Although most studies were not di-
rectly comparable, because of the different periods, techniques or banking firms selected, some
stylized facts emerged such as the productivity gains experienced by most Spanish financial
institutions, or the higher cost efficiency of commercial banks with respect to savings banks.
However, most of these studies focused either on cost or (input) technical efficiency, with
fewer contributions dealing with profit or revenue efficiency. Yet both the cost and revenue
sides are relevant for determining profit efficiency, and the variety of scenarios might be mul-
tiple, as shown by Färe and Primont (1995). For instance, financial institutions that are cost
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efficient might not necessarily be revenue efficient, and vice versa, and the case could arise
that financial institutions which are both cost and revenue efficient are not profit efficient.
The relevance of revenue efficiency might have become even more important since the late
1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, when the booming Spanish economy was accompa-
nied by a general expansion of Spanish financial institutions (especially savings banks), whose
strategies were more tightly focused on maximizing revenues rather than minimizing costs.
The current economic and financial crisis is redefining these strategies, and the focus might be
changing again for the different financial institutions. In the particular case of savings banks,
most of them had set aggressive but costly geographic expansion policies that are now being
redefined (Illueca et al., 2009, 2014).
In this scenario, we have extended the analysis of efficiency to consider not only the cost
side but also the revenues of Spanish commercial banks, savings banks and credit unions
during both the pre-crisis years (from 2005 to 2007) and crisis years (2008 and 2009). Results
indicate that, on average, commercial banks were more efficient than both savings banks or
credit unions. This was especially apparent during the pre-crisis years, regardless of the type
of efficiency considered—whether cost or revenue efficiency. However, during the crisis years,
the differences between commercial banks and the other two types of financial institution
shrank dramatically, especially in the case of cost efficiency. These results were, in general,
robust to the type of efficiency considered and, for all sources of heterogeneity considered
(cost vs. revenue efficiency, commercial banks vs. savings banks vs. credit unions, pre-crisis
vs. crisis years) the differences were statistically significant.
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Table 1: Definitions of inputs, outputs and prices
Revenues and costs Outputs and inputs Output and input prices
Revenues Definition Output Definition Output prices (r) Definition
R1
Interest income (interest income
on loans+ other interest income)
y1 Customer loans r1 price corresponding to output 1
R2 Other operating income y2 Other operating income r2 price corresponding to output 2
Operating costs Input Input prices (ω) Definition
VC1 Total interest expenses vx1
Loanable funds (=Financial cap-
ital)
vw1 price corresponding to variable input 2
VC2 Personnel expenses vx2 Number of employees vw2 price corresponding to variable input 1
FC1 Other operating expenses f x1 Fixed assets (=Physical capital) f w1 price corresponding to fixed input 1
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Table 2: Cost, revenue and profit efficiency, descriptive statistics for the different bank types
(pre-crisis and crisis years)
Type of bank
Type of
efficiency
Pre-crisis (2005–2007) Crisis (2008–2009)
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Commercial
banks
Cost efficiency 98.4388 5.6636 98.8704 4.5051
Revenue efficiency 101.3407 5.775 101.3269 5.5294
Savings banks
Cost efficiency 92.8358 11.0777 98.3298 4.8618
Revenue efficiency 108.3407 13.7447 102.2747 6.6915
Credit unions
Cost efficiency 95.0466 7.2895 98.1244 5.3424
Revenue efficiency 111.1804 19.9204 104.2216 12.1083
All banks
Cost efficiency 95.2593 8.6746 98.3193 5.0521
Revenue efficiency 107.4329 15.4497 103.1369 9.8628
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Table 3: Distribution hypothesis tests (Li, 1996), model
All years Pre-crisis Crisis
Cost vs. revenue
efficiency
f (CE, all banks) = g(RE, all banks)
T-statistic 0.1596 1.9060 1.5674
p-value 0.4366 0.0283 0.0585
f (CE, commercial banks) =
g(RE, commercial banks)
T-statistic 0.0825 0.0950 0.0279
p-value 0.4671 0.4622 0.4889
f (CE, savings banks) =
g(RE, savings banks)
T-statistic 0.8978 2.4297 0.5259
p-value 0.1846 0.0076 0.2995
f (CE, credit unions) =
g(RE, credit unions)
T-statistic 0.6968 4.3610 1.1520
p-value 0.2430 0.0000 0.1247
Notes: the functions f (·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for each model being compared.
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Table 4: Distribution hypothesis tests (Li, 1996), type of bank
All years Pre-crisis Crisis
Cost efficiency
f (CE, commercial banks) =
g(CE, savings banks)
T-statistic 5.1994 6.8999 0.0678
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.4730
f (CE, commercial banks) =
g(CE, credit unions)
T-statistic 3.2977 8.5318 –0.3036
p-value 0.0005 0.0000 0.6193
f (CE, savings banks) =
g(CE, credit unions)
T-statistic –0.0828 –0.1797 –0.3289
p-value 0.5330 0.5713 0.6289
Revenue efficiency
f (RE, commercial banks) =
g(RE, savings banks)
T-statistic 6.4959 7.3144 0.5462
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.2924
f (RE, commercial banks) =
g(RE, credit unions)
T-statistic 6.6964 8.3006 0.5705
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.2842
f (RE, savings banks) =
g(RE, credit unions)
T-statistic –0.4192 0.0945 –0.4256
p-value 0.6625 0.4624 0.6648
Notes: the functions f (·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for each model being compared.
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Table 5: Distribution hypothesis tests (Li, 1996), context
Cost
efficiency
Revenue
efficiency
Pre-crisis vs. crisis
years
f (Pre-crisis, all banks) =
g(Crisis, all banks)
T-statistic 8.9881 3.5159
p-value 0.0000 0.0002
f (Pre-crisis, commercial banks) =
g(Crisis, commercial banks)
T-statistic –0.2810 –0.3327
p-value 0.6106 0.6303
f (Pre-crisis, savings banks) =
g(Crisis, savings banks)
T-statistic 4.5713 2.5002
p-value 0.0000 0.0062
f (Pre-crisis, credit unions) =
g(Crisis, credit unions)
T-statistic 9.1343 4.7412
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: the functions f (·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for each model being compared.
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